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“Decades of lies and intimidation could not make 
the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire 
their own enslavement.”1 
-President George W. Bush, May 1, 2003   
                  
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Although he Bush administration began Operation Iraqi Freedom with 
the pretext of searching for weapons of mass destruction,2 the operation 
ultimately liberated a nation that spent decades under a dictatorial regime. For 
at least the past twenty to thirty years, the Iraqi people,3 including the Kurds, 
lived as victims of their own government. Saddam Hussein and his regime 
victimized the Iraqi people through torture, execution, and deportation. As 
President Bush stated in his address on May 1, 2003, America is “pursuing and 
finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to account for their 
                                                          
1
 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (May 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html (last visited April 
7, 2004). 
2
 The Bush administration has yet to find any weapons of mass destruction. The 
Gospel According to George, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 2004, at 18. Nevertheless, a number of 
views emerged about Bush’s policy even before that admission. See Ivan Eland, Symposium, 
What Should the United States Do About Saddam Hussein?, 50 EMORY L.J. 833, 853 (2001) 
(“Despite the conduct of a wise, restrained military policy during the first 165 years of the 
nation's history, the aberration of more than fifty years of Cold War and post-Cold War U.S. 
interventionism now seems like the norm and has led U.S. presidents to become arrogant in 
their exercise of U.S. military power overseas. George W. Bush has promised the American 
public a more "humble" foreign policy. Let it begin with U.S. policy toward Iraq.”); Norman 
G. Printer, Jr., Deterring Saddam Hussein: Between Iraq and a Hard Place, 30 S.U. L. Rev. 85, 
97 (2003) (The current Bush Administration urged the Council to adopt smart sanctions that 
would have reduced the number of dual-use items and expanded the number of humanitarian 
items, while offering incentives and disincentives to Iraq's neighbors aimed at stifling 
smuggling.”). 
3 An initial, but imperative distinction exists between “Iraq” as the Arab Ba’ath 
Socialist Party led by Saddam Hussein and “Iraq” as the Iraqi people. The Security Council’s 
use of “Iraq” in Resolutions 1441 and 688 targeted only Saddam Hussein and his regime. In 
2002, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1441 which stipulated that Iraq 
“has been and remains in material breach of its obligations,” but extended it a “final 
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.” S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th 
Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, 5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441 (2002). The Security Council referenced 
Resolution 688, S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688v 
(1991), which demanded Iraq “immediately end” the “repression of the Iraqi civilian 
population, and allow organizations providing humanitarian relief to aid those needing help.” 
Id.  In closing, the Resolution warned Iraq that it would “face serious consequences” if it 
continued to violate its obligations. Id. For more information on the use of force under the 
authority of the United Nations Security Council, see Patrick McLain, Note, Settling the Score 
with Saddam: Resolution 1441 and Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force Against Iraq, 
13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 233, 241 (2003); Printer, supra note 2. 
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crimes.”4 After United States troops captured Hussein on December 13, 2003,5 
President Bush declared, “now the former director of Iraq will face the justice 
he denied to millions.”6     
On January 9, 2004, the United States officially declared Saddam 
Hussein a prisoner of war and indicated that it will turn him over to a special 
court established by the Iraqi Governing Council under the direction of the 
Coalition Provisional Authority.7 Yet, prosecution in this forum fails to ensure 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Article 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and does not prohibit the 
death penalty. Further, such prosecution requires the application of Iraqi 
criminal law and procedure where otherwise unarticulated in the statute 
creating it.8 This might allow Hussein to twist the laws he implemented to his 
advantage. Consequently, this Article focuses on alternative fora for 
jurisdiction over Hussein, recommends an ad hoc international criminal 
tribunal that does not provide for the death penalty, and examines Hussein’s 
liability for genocide against the Kurds and crimes against humanity. 
This Article will explore and catalogue the international case against 
Hussein for injuries inflicted on the Iraqis and the Kurds before the war began. 
Although the focus will remain primarily on Saddam Hussein, much of the 
rationale also applies to other regime participants. Part II begins with a 
historical overview of the Iraqi peoples’ oppression and focuses on the 
consequences of Hussein’s decisions and orders. Part III reviews different 
jurisdictional options including a national trial by Iraq, prosecution in the 
United States, the International Criminal Court, and an international ad hoc 
tribunal akin to those established in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. This Part 
ultimately recommends that Hussein’s prosecution take place in an 
international ad hoc tribunal situated in Iraq. The Security Council, under its 
Chapter VII authority, may establish an ad hoc criminal tribunal to prosecute 
Hussein for committing or participating in crimes against humanity and 
genocide. Part IV discusses Iraq’s international legal obligations including 
treaties and United Nations membership requirements. Part V examines the 
legal ramifications of Hussein’s genocide campaign against the Kurds and 
applies the relevant elements to Hussein’s actions. It also addresses the limited 
                                                          
4
 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (May 1, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html (last visited April 
7, 2004). 
5
 Prior to his capture, a number of scholars debated the merits of forcible abduction. 
See Louis R. Beres, Why and How Saddam Must be Punished: A Jurisprudential/Philosophic 
Explanation, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 667 (1998). 
6
 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Capture of Saddam 
Hussein (Dec. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html (last visited Jan. 19, 
2004). 
7
 Saddam Hussein as a P.O.W.: Q & A on the Prisoner-of-War Status of Saddam 
Hussein, HUMAN RIGHTS NEWS, Jan. 22, 2004, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/27/iraq7076.htm#5 (last visited Feb. 15, 2004). 
8
 Id. 
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arguments that Hussein’s defense counsel could raise. Part VI applies 
international principles concerning crimes against humanity to Saddam 
Hussein’s most flagrant crimes against the Iraqi citizens.9  
II. A HISTORY OF OPPRESSION 
 
Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq obtained its independence 
from British occupation in 1932. Several ethnic groups comprise Iraq’s total 
population of 24,683,313: Arabs form 75% to 80% of the population; Kurds 
comprise 15% to 20% of the population, and Turkomans and Assyrians make 
up the remainder of the population.10 The Kurds have occupied the northern 
mountainous regions of Iraq since the 12th century when the world referred to 
the region as “Kurdistan.”11 Because the Kurds lived in the mountains, 
separated from the main cities in Iraq, they developed their own distinct culture 
and language. Despite their geographical and cultural separation, the Kurds did 
not enjoy political independence. From the 16th to early 20th century, the 
Ottoman and Persian Empires ruled the Kurds.12 Although the Kurds briefly 
experienced a year of independence in 1946 by forming their own republic, the 
Iraqi regime controlled Kurdish territory for the vast majority of the 20th 
century.13 Since the 1920s, the Kurds have struggled for independence by 
staging various unsuccessful revolts.14 These revolts led to Iraqi government 
attempts to quash the rebellion and ultimately exterminate the Kurds through 
the Anfal campaigns. 
A. The Anfal Campaigns 
Iraqis used the name Anfal, or “the spoils,” to refer to a series of staged 
military actions against the Kurds of northern Iraq. The Ba’ath Party formed a 
complex power structure; full comprehension of Hussein’s control of the anti-
Kurdish campaigns requires a basic grasp of its components. The highest 
                                                          
9
 Although evidence of war crimes also exists, any discussion of past or future war 
crimes is beyond the scope of this Article. Adjudication of these war crimes would require 
separate consideration of jurisdictional issues to address Iraq’s counter-allegations against the 
United States. For more information about past war crimes committed by Iraq, see James S. 
Robbins, War Crimes: The Case of Iraq, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 45 (1994); Kenneth A. 
Williams, The Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: An Analysis of the Unresolved Issue of War Crimes 
Liability, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 385 (1992). 
10
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2003), available at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2004). These groups speak 
Arabic, Kurdish, Assyrian, and Armenian.  
11
 MIDDLE EAST WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ 23 (1993) (citing P. J. BRAIDWOOD, 
PREHISTORIC INVESTIGATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN (1960)). 
12
 Id. at 24. 
13
 Id. at 24-26. 
14
 Id. at 24. The Kurds have also fought against one another because of ideological 
and personal dissension. Although they united briefly after the first Gulf War, division and 
conflict quickly reappeared. Gavin A. Symes, Note, Force Without Law: Seeking A Legal 
Justification for the September 1996 U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
581, 585 (1998). 
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executive body was the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)  over which 
Hussein exercised ultimate power as Chairman.15 The RCC controlled a 
number of regionally based committees including the Northern Affairs 
Committee where Hussein served as secretary until around 1970. He 
eventually delegated that power to his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid.16 Prior to 
Hussein’s rise to dictator, he served as the RCC member in charge of “Kurdish 
affairs.”17 Before he went into hiding, Saddam Hussein also served as the 
commander-in-chief for the armed forces, President of the Republic of Iraq, 
and Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party. 
In May of 1992 and March of 1993, Human Rights Watch, an 
international human rights organization, facilitated the shipment of eighteen 
tons of official Iraqi government documents to the United States. The Kurds 
uncovered these documents during their 1991 uprising. The prosecutor in 
Saddam Hussein’s trial may rely on these documents as evidence of Hussein’s 
participation and oversight of the campaign against the Kurds. Other evidence 
might consist of eyewitness accounts and forensic evidence obtained by the 
Middle East Watch in collaboration with Physicians for Human Rights. The 
Kurds recovered the majority of the following accounts and documents from 
the offices of Iraq’s internal intelligence agency, the General Security 
Directorate (“secret police”). 
The plight of the Kurds at the hands of Hussein’s regime began well 
before the first Gulf War. Beginning in 1985, Hussein’s plan to address 
“Kurdish affairs” formed a systematic program of destruction for Kurdish 
villages through chemical weapons and military force, subsequent relocation of 
the Kurds in concentration camps, and summary executions upon arrival. In 
1988, Iraqi forces killed as many as 182,000 Kurds and destroyed at least 
4,000 Kurdish villages.18 
Until 1988, no government had ever used chemical weapons against its 
own people.19 Governments may not use chemical weapons under any 
circumstances.20 Yet, Hussein’s regime used mustard and nerve gas against at 
                                                          
15
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE 
KURDS 76 n.37 (1993). The RCC forcibly returned to power in 1968. The chairman of the 
RCC was the “president of the republic . . . . the supreme organ of the state, charged with the 
mission of carrying out the popular will by removing from power the reactionary, the 
dictatorial, and the corrupt elements of society and by returning power to the people.” 
Catherine S. Knowles, Life and Human Dignity, the Birthright of All Human Beings: An 
Analysis of the Iraqi Genocide of the Kurds and Effective Enforcement of Human Rights, 45 
NAVAL L. REV. 152, 152, 155-56 (1998) (citing MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 11, at 25). 
16
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 76 n.37. 
17
 Id. at 33. 
18
 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS, STAFF 
REPORT ON KURDISTAN IN THE TIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 56 (Comm. Print 1991) (primarily 
authored by Peter W. Galbraith); see also GERARD CHALIAND, THE KURDISH TRAGEDY 3 
(1994). 
19
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 61.  
20
 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, U.N. 
GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 27, U.N. Doc. A/47/27, App. I (1992), reprinted in SHADOW 
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least sixty villages and the town Halabja. This offensive aimed to terrorize the 
Kurdish civilian population, flush villagers from their homes, and ultimately 
capture, relocate, and kill them.21 The gas attack in Halabja alone killed 5,000 
people and prompted approximately 80,000 people to flee to Iran.22 One 
survivor of a chemical attack on Birjinni stated that he observed, “‘white, black 
and then yellow [clouds of smoke], rising about fifty or sixty yards into the air 
in a column. Then the column began to break up and drift. It drifted down into 
the valley and then passed through the village. Then we smelled the gas.’”23 At 
first, “‘it smelled of apples and something sweet,’” but then “‘it became 
bitter.’”24 As a result of the attacks, those exposed to the gases experienced 
vomiting, blindness, and painful swellings under their arms.25 
Once it finished using chemical and conventional bombing, the army 
and domestic militia dynamited and bulldozed Kurdish villages.26 The Iraqi 
army destroyed at least 703 Kurdish villages in 1987 alone.27 After the armies 
razed the village of Serkand Khailani, officials arrested most of the villagers 
and later subjected the leaders to beatings with cables, suspensions from 
ceiling hooks, and electric shocks to the earlobes.28 Some of those arrested 
were executed.29 Others were sent to the collective camps.30 The Iraqi 
government painstakingly videotaped and documented a number of these 
events.31  
To serve as a lesson to others, President Hussein approved a special 
plan for dealing with Kurds in the Marsh areas.32 The plan entailed poisoning, 
bombing, and burning the homes of friends and relatives of subversives in the 
                                                                                                                                                         
AND SUBSTANCE: THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 307 (Benoit Morel & Kyle Olson 
eds., 1993). 
21
 The Human Rights Watch has cataloged the forty known attacks. HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 15, at 360-63.  
22
 International Federation for Human Rights, Report on Iraq: Continuous and Silent 
Ethnic Cleansing, Displaced Persons in Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraqi Refugees in Iran, at 7 
(January, 2003), available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/iq350a.pdf (last visited April 7, 
2004). 
23
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 270. 
24Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDLESS TORMENT: THE 1991 UPRISING IN 
IRAQ AND ITS AFTERMATH, at n.8 (1992), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm (last visited, Feb. 22, 2004). 
25
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 62.  
26
 Id. at 107. 
27
 Id. at 73. 
28
 Id. at 325. 
29
 Id.  
30
 International Federation for Human Rights, supra note 22, at 6.  
31
 See, e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur’s Report, E/CN.4/1993/45 (Feb. 19, 1993). This 
report contains a document marked confidential and personal that gives instructions for 
carrying out the demolition of villages. 
32
 IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND THE TRANSITION 
FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 146 (1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDLESS 
TORMENT: THE 1991 UPRISING IN IRAQ AND ITS AFTERMATH (1992), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).  
  7 
Marsh areas.33 It also included an economic blockade to more efficiently 
“‘limit provision of their daily living needs’” by diminishing food supplies, 
banning fish sales, and banning goods.34 To date, no official documents have 
been found concerning these camps. However, various agencies recorded 
testimony of the incarcerated Kurdish people, and at least one letter from Amn 
Suleimaniyeh35 to the director of security of the Autonomous Region exists.36 
This letter documents the execution of nineteen people for “being found in 
prohibited areas” and forty-seven for being “subversives sentenced to death by 
the Revolutionary Court.”37 It also notes the deportation of 9,030 people sent 
to the “Popular Army camp in the governate of al-Ta’mim.”38  
 Interviews with survivors revealed the conditions and treatment at the 
camps. Upon arrival, guards divided men and women into separate camps and 
body searched them.39 One man, after being beaten with sticks and electric 
cables, was hung from a ceiling fan and scorched with hot steel.40 Prisoners 
used cans for bowel movements, ate soup filled with leftover bones and oil, 
and often received no food at all.41  
Convoys carried the Kurds from the camps out into the country for 
execution by firing squad.42 At least six people survived.43 One of the 
survivors stated: “[i]n place of the handcuffs, the guards used a length of string 
to tie the twenty-eight prisoners in a single line by their left hands. The men 
were ordered to stand facing a freshly dug trench, just long enough to 
accommodate the twenty-eight bodies as they fell.”44 A gravedigger working in 
the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq stated, “‘I must have buried 600 or maybe up 
to 1,000 people—all killed by the secret police between 1985 and 1989. 
Sometimes they were peshmerga, sometimes women, sometimes children. 
Sometimes they’d been tortured.’”45  
 A number of government documents prohibiting human life in 
designated areas of the Kurdish countryside confirm the truth behind these 
statements. Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid signed one  personal 
directive, numbered 28/3650, which stated “[w]ithin their jurisdiction, the 
                                                          
33
 IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 146.  
34Id.  
35
 Iraqi headquarters in the city of Suleimaniyeh. 
36
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 141-42. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Id. 
39
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 213, available at 
http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFAL8.htm (last visited February 17, 2004). 
40
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 145-47. 
41
 Id. at 144. 
42
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 160-61.  
43
 Id.  
44
 Id. at 161.  
45
 IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 30. Peshmerga are “those who face 
death,” namely Kurdish fighters. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 370.  
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armed forces must kill any human being or animal present within these areas. 
They are totally prohibited.”46 Hussein also targeted Shi’a Muslims after the 
March 1991 uprising, where he publicly stated that the participating Shi’a 
Muslims should be shot for treason.47 Even before these directives, guards shot 
around 150 men and boys at al-Mahawil Garrison.48 Guards threw others from 
the top floor of a hospital, drowned them, dragged them through the streets, or 
left them hanging from electricity poles to terrorize the locals.49 In their 
attempts to retake the cities involved in the 1991 uprising, loyalist forces used 
helicopters to attack unarmed civilians, arrested or shot civilians without 
charge, and executed young men in the streets and in hospitals.50  
 In 1998, the New York Times reported that Hussein executed at least 
1,500 people in one year for “political reasons.”51 Hussein’s son, Qusay 
Hussein, ordered the executions as part of a prison-cleansing campaign. The 
Husseins then required the family members of the executed prisoners to pay 
for the bullets before they could claim and bury the bodies.52 In many ways, 
the methodical calculation of costs and benefits without regard for human 
dignity resembles that of Adolph Hitler in ordering the extermination of the 
Jews. Hussein’s method of conducting the Anfal campaigns by defining the 
Kurds as the target, concentrating them in one area, and executing them fits the 
pattern used by the Nazis.53 
B. Alternative “Justice” 
1. A Lack of Judicial Process 
 
Hussein did not, however, limit his disregard for human life to the 
Kurds. He established a court system for all Iraqis that provided few 
opportunities for fair hearings and multiple occasions for excessive 
punishment. Trials in Iraq were often conducted before “special courts” and 
were always conducted in camera.54 Hussein employed military officers and 
civil servants who lacked judicial training and the autonomy necessary to make 
impartial judgments.55 The regime sometimes restricted aid from attorneys or 
                                                          
46
 Id. at 79-80.  
47
 Amnesty International, Human Rights Committee Briefing, AI Index MDE 
14/08/97, at 7 (Oct. 8, 1997). 
48
 Id.   
49
 Id.  
50
 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 32. 
51
 HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: 
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 14 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting Barbara Crossett, 1,500 Executions Cited 
for Iraq in Past Year, Mostly for Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at A1). 
52
 Id. 
53
 See generally RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 267 
(1985). 
54
 Amnesty International Report 2002, Iraq 1-3 (2002). 
55
 Id. 
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government-appointed lawyers to the actual trial date.56 In April of 2001, a 
“special court” sentenced four people to life in prison for simply “attempting to 
form a political grouping.”57 
The Iraqi government frequently arrested both the people suspected of 
anti-government activities and their families.58 Officials arrested a retired 
medical doctor and his brother-in-law in March of 2001 simply to pressure his 
wife, also a doctor, to return to Iraq.59 On July 26, 2002, several of the United 
Nations special rapporteurs addressed a letter to the Iraqi government 
requesting information on two individuals who reportedly engaged in “terrorist 
acts” inside Iraq.60 The letter stated, “it is feared that their confessions [on 
national television] may have been extracted under duress and that televised 
statements may have an impact upon the fairness of their trial.” 61 The 
Rapporteurs expressed further concern that the men were “at risk of being 
sentenced to death and executed.”62 They received no response. The Report 
also stated that no positive developments occurred in relation to missing 
persons.63 
2. Punishments 
 
On June 5, 1994, Iraq’s highest executive body, the Revolutionary 
Command Council (RCC) published a series of decrees in the official Iraqi 
newspaper, Al-Jumhuriya, which required amputations and brandings as 
punishments for at least 30 crimes.64 Saddam Hussein signed each of the 
decrees in his position as Chairman of the RCC.65 In 2000, Hussein and his 
officials reportedly began using tongue amputation to punish people who 
criticized him or his family.66 Guards allegedly performed such an amputation 
on July 17, 2000 in front of a large crowd.67 Hussein’s decrees prescribed the 
death penalty for car theft, counterfeiting, smuggling cars or drilling machines, 
                                                          
56
 Id. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special 
Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 
Agenda Item 111 (c), at 8, U.N. Doc. A/57/325 (2002). The reports came from the United 
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Commission on Human Rights, along with the Rapporteur 
on Torture and the Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions. 
61
 Id. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special 
Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., 
Annex, Agenda Item 100, at 44-59, U.N. Doc. A/49/651 (1994).  
65
 Id. at 44-59. 
66
 Bureau Of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports On Human 
Rights Practices-Iraq (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18277.htm 
(last visited April 7, 2004). 
67
 Id.  
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organizing a group of two or more persons for procurement purposes, 
falsifying military service documents, and stealing (when committed by a 
member of the armed forces or government employee).68 
 A report by the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur stated that the 
government executed forty-three prisoners on February 3, 2000.69 Thirty were 
reportedly executed for theft, two for drug trafficking, and eleven for affiliation 
with the political opposition.70 In this same report, the Special Rapporteur 
stated that he was: 
of the opinion that Iraq continues to be in 
violation of its obligations under the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, if only because of the sheer numbers of 
executions that are taking place and what appear 
to be extrajudicial executions on political 
grounds and in the absence of a due process of 
law.71 
 
In December of 2000, the United Nations General Assembly issued a 
Resolution strongly condemning Saddam Hussein and his government for 
“systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of 
international humanitarian law.”72 The condemnation extended to suppressions 
of fundamental freedoms, the widespread use of the death penalty in violation 
of the ICCPR, arbitrary executions, widespread and systematic torture, and the 
prescription of cruel and inhuman punishments.73 In his “leadership” 
capacities, Hussein committed countless human rights violations.74  
Numerous current reports continue to document human rights 
violations by Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials.75 Up until “Operation Iraqi 
Freedom,” the United Nations delegated a special rapporteur to report on the 
humanitarian situation in Iraq. Unfortunately, this did little to alleviate the 
situation.  
III. JURISDICTIONAL OPTIONS 
 
                                                          
68
 Id. Hussein personally signed each decree. 
69
 Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special 
Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 
Annex, Agenda Item 116(c), at 12, U.N. Doc. A/55/294 (2000). 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. at 20. 
72
 G.A. Res. 55/115, U.N. GAOR, 81st Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/115 (2000). 
73Id. 
74
 This article will examine only the deportation, imprisonment, severe deprivation of 
physical liberties, and torture of the Kurdish population. 
75
 See, e.g., Amnesty International Report 2002, supra note 54, at 1-3; A Decade Of 
Deception And Defiance: Saddam Hussein’s Defiance Of The United Nations 11-17 (2002) 
(White House Background Paper) available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/13456.htm (last 
visited April 7, 2004). 
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 Before reaching the merits of the case, one must consider which courts 
could validly exercise jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein’s prosecution. Four 
primary potential fora exist: (1) Iraqi national courts, (2) United States federal 
courts asserting universal jurisdiction, (3) the International Criminal Court 
through special appointment by the Security Council, or (4) an ad hoc tribunal 
set up by the United Nations Security Council. The jurisdictional decision will 
play a major role in determining both applicable law and procedural 
constraints. 
A. Trial by the Iraqi Citizens 
 
 Since most of Hussein’s crimes occurred in Iraq and against the Iraqi 
people, Iraq retains territorial jurisdiction. The accessibility of physical 
evidence, victims, and witnesses makes Iraqi courts seem like a sensible 
jurisdiction. A trial in Iraq may promote healing and reconciliation for victims 
of the regime. However, heads of state, such as Saddam Hussein, may avoid 
rigorous prosecution in their own territories by scare tactics, force, and an 
ability to manipulate the law. Additionally, it could take a considerable amount 
of time for a viable government capable of running the national courts to 
emerge. As evidenced by the number of insurgencies in Iraq after the capture 
of Hussein, a number of his supporters still exist. 
Even with the installation of a new Iraqi government, it could take 
years for the government to create a workable court system. Once the new 
regime begins, the likelihood of a fair trial by a new government attempting to 
purge the old leadership would be slim. Many proposed leaders of the new 
government lived in exile under Saddam Hussein’s rule and may view his trial 
as a unique opportunity for retaliation. For Hussein to receive the “justice he 
denied to millions,”76 a neutral judge, or panel of judges, should preside over 
his trial. 
B. National Prosecution by the United States 
Theoretically, United States courts provide a second option for 
prosecution. Domestic courts can invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute 
Iraqi officials.77 Yet, according to the concept of immunity for acts committed 
                                                          
76
 President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Capture of Saddam 
Hussein (Dec. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html (last visited Jan. 19, 
2004). 
77
 Until fairly recently, outside states struggled to find a legal justification for 
jurisdiction over diplomatic figures, particularly when the international community refused to 
act. The Introductory Comment to the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with 
Respect to Crime 1935 listed five general principles, in order of jurisdiction consideration. The 
“territorial principle,” determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offense was 
committed, was of primary importance; the “nationality principle,” determining jurisdiction by 
reference to the nationality or national character of the person committing the offense, was also 
universally accepted; the “protective principle,” determining jurisdiction by reference to the 
  12 
by heads of state while in office, the United States court might find Hussein 
substantively liable but procedurally immune.  
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction,78 any state, regardless of 
its direct involvement in the conflict or offense, may prosecute “certain 
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such 
                                                                                                                                                         
national interest injured by the offense, was recognized in most states; the “universality 
principle,” determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the person committing the 
offense, was widely accepted, but not universal; and finally, the “passive personality 
principle,” determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the 
person injured by the offense, was considered auxiliary in character an probably not essential if 
the ends were served by any other principle. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 264-66 (5th ed. 1998). 
The universality principal resembles humani generis theory. Hostes humani generis 
means “enemies of the human race.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 742 (7th ed. 1999). 
Authorities could apprehend perpetrators who committed acts considered universally 
reprehensible wherever they went. The theory originally applied only to pirates. See id.; see 
also Edith Y. Wu, Saddam Hussein as Hostes Humani Generis? Should the U.S. Intervene?, 
26 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 55, 56 (1998). 
78
 The Harvard Research Draft Convention proposed universal jurisdiction in the 
following situations: 
Article 10: 
 
(a) When committed in a place not subject to its 
authority but subject to the authority of another state, if the 
act or omission which constitutes the crime is also an 
offence by the law of the place where it was committed, if 
surrender of the alien for prosecution has been offered to 
such other state or states and the offer remains unaccepted, 
and if prosecution is not barred by lapse of time under the 
law of the place where the crime was committed. The 
penalty imposed shall in no case be more severe than the 
penalty prescribed for the same act or omission by the law 
of the place where the crime was committed. 
(b) When committed in a place not subject to the 
authority of any state, if the act or omission which 
constitutes the crime is also an offence by the law of a 
state of which the alien is a national, if surrender of the 
alien for prosecution remains unaccepted, and if 
prosecution is not barred by lapse of time under the law of 
a state of which the alien is a national. The penalty 
imposed shall in no case be more severe than the penalty 
prescribed for the same act or omission by the law of a 
state of which the alien is a national. 
(c) When committed in a place not subject to the 
authority of any state, if the crime was committed to the 
injury of the state assuming jurisdiction, or of one of its 
nationals, or of a corporation or juristic person having its 
national character. 
(d) When committed in a place not subject to the 
authority of any state and the alien is not a national of any 
state.  
 
HARRIS, supra note 77, at 288-89 (internal citations omitted). 
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as . . . genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”79 Behind 
the principle of universal jurisdiction lies the theory that genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes not only violate international law but also 
offend the whole of humanity.80 Ideally all states would work both collectively 
and individually to prosecute violators. Universal jurisdiction invoked by 
individual states furthers several important goals: attaining justice for 
victims,81 deterring future human rights abuses through public prosecutions of 
senior officials,82 demonstrating international concern and collective responses 
toward human rights violations,83 and protecting the sanctity of ordered 
society.84  
A number of treaties concerning drug-trafficking,85 hijacking,86 aircraft 
terrorism,87 hostages,88 torture,89 apartheid,90 and attacks on diplomats91 
expressly include the right to invoke universal jurisdiction. Universal 
jurisdiction endows every state with jurisdiction over a limited category of 
crimes such as piracy and slave trading.92 The list of crimes subject to 
universal jurisdiction continues to expand.93 As one United States court 
                                                          
79
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 404, 423 (1987). 
80
 INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, HARD CASES: BRINGING 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS TO JUSTICE ABROAD 4-5 (1999).  
81
 Id. at 9-10.  
82
 Id. at 11-12.  
83
 Id. at 16. 
84
 Id.  
85
 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Art. 36(2)(iv), 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (1965); see 
also 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, Art. 4(2)(b), Misc. 14 (1989); 
D.P.P. v. Doot, [1973] A.C. 807, HL (Lord Wilberforce). 
86
 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, Art. 
4, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (1971). 
87
 Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Civil Aviation 1971, Art. 5, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1974). 
88
 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Art. 5, 18 I.L.M. 
1456, entered into force 1983. 
89
 1984 United Nations Torture Convention, Art. 5(2), 23 I.L.M. 1027, entered into 
force 1987 [hereinafter Torture Convention]; see also Ahcene Boulesbaa, An Analysis of the 
1984 Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 4 DICK. J. INT’L L. 185 (1986). 
90
 Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973, 
Art. II-IV, 13 I.L.M. 50, entered into force 1976. 
91
 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally 
Protected Persons including Diplomats 1973, Art. 2, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, entered into force 
1977. 
92
 For more information on piracy, see Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy 
Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335-39 (1925). 
93
 The list of crimes considered eligible for universal jurisdiction in the United States 
constantly expands. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (making several references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses under 
the universality principal but ultimately deciding to dismiss the action); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 
630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (likening the defendant, a Paraguayan torturer to pirates and 
slave traders, the quintessential defendants eligible for universal jurisdiction); Von Dardel v. 
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observed, “nations have begun to extend jurisdiction to . . . crimes considered 
in the modern era to be as great a threat to the well-being of the international 
community as piracy.”94  
Despite an increasing willingness to invoke universal jurisdiction, the 
United States must overcome certain procedural hurdles before prosecuting. 
United States domestic law includes international law,95 and international law 
recognizes universal jurisdiction for certain offenses such as piracy, war 
crimes, and genocide.96 However, a person cannot be tried in a United States 
federal court for an international crime unless Congress first adopts a statute 
defining and punishing the offense.97 For the United States to prosecute 
Hussein three things must occur: (1) Congress must have enacted statutes to 
punish genocide and crimes against humanity, (2) the prosecutor must avoid 
the obstacle of immunity for heads of state, and (3) Colin Powell must deflect 
international criticism that prosecution represents the victors’ “justice” for the 
vanquished.  
                                                                                                                                                         
Union of Socivet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) (mentioning the 
“concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant international 
standards . . . embodied in the principle of ‘universal’ violations of international law”); In re 
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (deciding that Israel’s jurisdiction to 
prosecute a guard from a concentration camp “conforms with the international law principle of 
universal jurisdiction”), aff’d sub nom, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal. 
1981) (recognizing universal jurisdiction to punish terrorist acts against internationally 
protected persons such as diplomats); William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of 
International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729, 
732 (discussing the trend toward regional international law enforcement). 
94
 Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 223. 
95
 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 667, 712 (1900).  
96
 Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582. 
97
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§§ 404 cmt. b(1) (1987).  
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Congress banned genocide in 18 U.S.C. § 1091.98 This codification 
                                                          
98
 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2000): 
(a) Basic offense.--Whoever, whether in time of peace or 
in time of war, in a circumstance described in subsection 
(d) and with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in 
substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious 
group as such-- 
(1) kills members of that group; 
(2) causes serious bodily injury to members of 
that group; 
(3) causes the permanent impairment of the 
mental faculties of members of the group through 
drugs, torture, or similar techniques; 
(4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are 
intended to cause the physical destruction of the 
group in whole or in part; 
(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; or 
(6) transfers by force children of the group to 
another group; 
or attempts to do so, shall be punished as 
provided in subsection (b). 
 
(b) Punishment for basic offense.--The punishment for an 
offense under subsection (a) is-- 
 
(1) in the case of an offense under subsection 
(a)(1) where death results, by death or 
imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than 
$1,000,000, or both; and 
(2) a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or 
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or 
both, in any other case. 
 
(c) Incitement offense.--Whoever in a circumstance 
described in subsection (d) directly and publicly incites 
another to violate subsection (a) shall be fined not more 
than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or 
both. 
 
(d) Required circumstance for offenses.--The circumstance 
referred to in subsections (a) and (c) is that-- 
 
(1) the offense is committed within the United 
States; or 
(2) the alleged offender is a national of the United 
States (as defined in section 101 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
1101)). 
 
(e) Non-applicability of certain limitations.--
Notwithstanding section 3282 of this title, in the case of an 
offense under subsection (a)(1), an indictment may be 
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simply recognized the accepted practice of using universal jurisdiction to 
punish genocide.99 Israel first used universal jurisdiction in the Eichmann case 
to prosecute Eichmann for executing Hitler’s “final solution” during World 
War II.100 In its opinion convicting him, the Nuremburg Tribunal stated that 
some offenses against the whole of humanity are so grave that “the judicial and 
legislative organs of every country [need] to give effect to its criminal 
interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial.”101  
The United States accepted this principle in approving Israel’s request 
for the extradition of Demjanjuk.102 The federal district court decided that 
Israel had jurisdiction to try Demjanjuk since “[i]nternational law provides that 
certain offenses may be punished by any state because the offenders are 
‘common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their 
apprehension and punishment.”103 As a party to the United Nations, which 
affirmed the Nuremberg Tribunal for punishing “persecutions on political, 
racial, or religious grounds” regardless of whether offenders acted “as 
individuals or as members of organizations,” the United States implicitly 
recognizes genocide as a crime against all of mankind.104  
Congress did not explicitly pass a statute forbidding crimes against 
humanity, but some statutes and court opinions indicate Congressional 
consent. Acquiescence may be inferred from the Alien Tort Claims Act105 and 
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.106 The Alien Tort Claims Act 
provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”107 As such, a victim of crimes against humanity 
could sue on claims of assault or battery arising from the incident. Federal 
courts held that this statute confers subject-matter jurisdiction when an alien 
                                                                                                                                                         
found, or information instituted, at any time without 
limitation. 
 
99
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 404 cmt. b(1) (1987).  
100
 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int’l L. Rep. 50 (Sup Ct. Israel 1962). 
Eichmann administered a policy that killed approximately 4,600,000 Jews. HARRIS, supra note 
77, at 280 (quoting REITLINGER, THE FINAL SOLUTION (1953)). 
101
 Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jm. 1961). For more 
information on the Eichmann trial and the use of the universality principle, see Kenneth C. 
Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 810 (1988).  
102
 In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Ohio 1985), affirmed 776 
F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1016 (1986). 
103
 Id.  
104
 See G.A. Res. 95(I), 1 U.N.GAOR, U.N.Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946); see also 
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 555 n.11 (quoting Article 6). 
105
 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Mark E. Wojcik et al., International Human Rights, 37 INT’L LAW. 597, 602 
(2003).  
106
 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, § 1 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
107
 Id. 
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sues for a tort committed in violation United States treaties or international 
law.108  
The Torture Victim Protection Act reinforces the widely held view that 
customary international law forbids torture.109 As a party to the United Nations 
Convention against Torture, which requires parties to facilitate the punishment 
of torture through their municipal law,110 the United States has an obligation to 
bring violators of the Convention to justice.111 Because the Convention adds to 
customary international law’s prohibition on torture and requires parties to 
fulfill their obligations regardless of the perpetrator’s nationality, the 
Convention essentially provides for universal jurisdiction.112 Thus, the United 
States could legitimately exercise jurisdiction to prosecute genocide and crimes 
against humanity in federal court.  
Impediments to American prosecution arise in light of conflicting 
views on immunity for heads of state such as Saddam Hussein.113 Under the 
concept of state immunity, the offender may be substantively liable, but 
procedurally immune before the courts of other countries. Tensions between 
the Pinochet case,114 authored by the House of Lords in London, and the more 
recent Yerodia case,115 adjudicated by the International Court of Justice, 
illustrate two divergent approaches to state immunity.  
                                                          
108
 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Amerada Hess 
Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987), rev’d on other 
grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
109
 Kadic v. Karadizic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980). 
110
 Article 4 of the Convention states: 
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of 
torture are offenses under its criminal law. The same shall 
apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any 
person which constitutes complicity or participation in 
torture. 
2. Each State Party shall make these offences 
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into 
account their grave nature. 
 
Torture Convention, supra note 89. 
 The United States recently opposed an Optional Protocol to the Convention. 
The Protocol established procedures for inspecting suspected torture detention facilities. Some 
credit this hesitation to the United States own treatment of prisoners from Operation Iraqi 
Freedom/the War on Terrorism. Wojcik, supra note 105, at 598. 
111
 See Torture Convention, supra note 89. 
112
 G.A. Res. 46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197 (providing for universal 
jurisdiction in its Introductory Note to Part VII). 
113
 See Monica Hans, Providing for Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction: Can Either the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or an 
International Criminal Court Accomplish This Goal?, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 357, 379 (2002). 
114
 Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999)..  
115
 Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ General List No. 121 (Feb. 14, 2002), available at 
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2004).  
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In deciding to extradite Senator Pinochet to Spain for crimes committed 
while acting as the head of state in Chile, the House of Lords examined 
Pinochet’s alleged immunity based on both on the grave nature of the 
underlying crime, and on an implied waiver of immunity within the United 
Nations Convention against Torture.116 Six Law Lords reached the general 
conclusion that Pinochet’s immunity dissipated because of torture’s status as a 
“serious international crime,” established by either jus cogens or international 
treaty.117 Under this approach, United States courts could adjudicate Hussein’s 
acts of genocide and crimes against humanity since those crimes would also 
amount to “serious international crimes.”  
Lord Saville employed a theory of implied waiver of immunity based 
on an assumption that the United Nations Convention against Torture 
abrogated Pinochet’s immunity per se.118 Although Iraq has not signed the 
Convention’s treaty, it did sign the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),119 which outlaws a number of crimes against 
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 Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 
147 (House of Lords 1999). 
117
 Id. 
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 Id. 
119
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force 1976, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. Article 6 states: 
 
1. Every human being has the inherent right to 
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life. 
2. In countries which have not abolished the death 
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the 
most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at 
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary 
to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out 
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent 
court. 
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime 
of genocide, it is understood that noting in this article shall 
authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to 
derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under 
the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right 
to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty, 
pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be 
granted in all cases. 
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for 
crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age and 
shall not be carried out on pregnant women. 
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay 
or prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State 
Party to the present Covenant.  
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humanity. In addition, Lord Phillips, in his opinion, decided that because 
national jurisdiction over universal crimes was such a new creation, traditional 
immunities did not apply.120 Accordingly, the United States could attempt to 
prosecute Hussein under both of these rationales. 
The legal bar to national jurisdiction arises in the Yerodia case, which 
examined the legality of an arrest warrant for Abdulaye Yerodia, the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs in the Congo.121 The majority in the Yerodia case cast doubt 
on two major principles from the Pinochet case: (1) whether a customary 
international law norm actually emerged to abrogate immunity for “serious 
international crimes”; and (2) whether national courts could prosecute officials 
under circumstances similar to those in Pinochet.122 In its opinion, the majority 
refused to waive immunity for incumbent officers, and stated that it could not 
“deduce . . . that there exists under customary international law any form of 
exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and 
inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are 
suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.”123  
When the International Court of Justice subsequently listed four 
circumstances where courts could prosecute high officials internationally, it 
excluded the circumstances of the Pinochet prosecution.124 Acceptable 
conditions for abrogating immunity for officials included the following 
circumstances: (1) when an official is charged in his or her own country and 
tried under the laws of that country, (2) when the official’s own state waives 
sovereign immunity, (3) when the official commits the acts “prior or 
subsequent to his or her period of office,” or “during that period of office in a 
private capacity,” or, finally, (4) when the official is prosecuted before an 
international court such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, “ICTY,” and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 
“ICTR,” or the International Criminal Court, “ICC.”125 Since Saddam Hussein 
committed genocide and crimes against humanity while acting as head of state 
and Iraq has not waived immunity, the only court with jurisdiction under this 
                                                                                                                                                         
Id. 
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 Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C. 
284-90 (House of Lords 1999); see also Sarah C. Rispin, Development, Implications of 
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium on the Pinochet Precedent: A Setback for 
International Human Rights Litigation? 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 527, 531 (2002).  
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analysis would be the ICC or an ad hoc tribunal set up by the Security Council 
that would resemble the ICTR and the ICTY.  
 Although the Congress enacted legislation enabling United States 
federal courts to prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity based on 
universal jurisdiction, Hussein’s immunity as head of state bars national 
prosecution. American courts could focus on the Pinochet case rather than the 
Yerodia case; however, given the public nature of such a trial, this selective 
focus might compromise the legitimacy of a conviction. At the 
recommendation of the International Court of Justice, only an ad hoc tribunal 
set up by the United Nations Security Council, or the ICC could legitimately 
abrogate Hussein’s official head of state immunity for acts committed while in 
office.  
C. The International Criminal Court 
 In light of the Yerodia case, the ICC appears ideal for prosecution of 
Saddam Hussein.126 However, jurisdictional limitations will foreclose this 
option unless the Security Council (1) fulfills its obligation to enforce its own 
resolutions through the ICC and (2) applies the enabling statute retroactively 
(as was done in the Nuremberg Tribunal). History and difficult negotiations 
surrounding the text of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s enabling statute, indicate 
that an ex post facto application of the ICC is unlikely to occur. 
On July 17, 1998, 120 countries adopted the text of the Rome Statute, 
which entered into force on July 1, 2002.127 Article 11 of the statute limits the 
court’s jurisdiction to crimes committed after it entered into force and applies 
only to states who acquiesce, or “sign-on,” to the statute.128 Although Hussein 
committed human rights violations throughout his dictatorship, many of his 
overt acts occurred during the 1980s, before the statute even existed. 
Additionally, but not surprisingly, Iraq has not signed the Rome Statute.129 
Article 13, however, allows the United Nation’s Security Council, under its 
Chapter VII power, to refer crimes to the ICC.130  
                                                          
126
 United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 
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 In reality, the Security Council’s powers remain the same. The Council 
implemented tribunals in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia.131 Theoretically, Iraq 
is no different. The difference lies in the forum as the ICC, rather than as an ad 
hoc tribunal. In 1991, the Security Council issued Resolution 688 that stated 
that it was “[g]ravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian 
population” and “[d]eeply disturbed by the magnitude of human suffering.”132 
Consequently, it insisted that Iraq “allow immediate access by international 
humanitarian organizations,” and requested the Secretary-General “pursue his 
humanitarian efforts in Iraq” and “use all the resources at his disposal, 
including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently 
the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population.”133 Although 
the Council laid the groundwork for intervention, for the ICC to exercise 
jurisdiction, the Council would need to not only refer Saddam Hussein to the 
ICC for trial, but also undermine the key principle of non-retroactivity.  
 Because many states accepted the Rome Statute because of its non-
retroactive stance, a retroactive application may cause these states to rethink 
their acquiescence to the ICC. Sensitive diplomatic issues may also arise since 
the United States refused to become a party to the ICC.134 The ICC imposes no 
obligations on non-party states. As it currently stands, Iraq need not comply 
with ICC orders, extradite individuals, or supply evidence.135 Tensions 
between the United States and the United Nations over war with Iraq could 
lead to a jurisdictional fight to prosecute. This would be particularly 
unfortunate in light of the necessity for unified international action. 
Even though the ICC does not provide a viable forum for prosecution, 
its principles and law will likely influence those applied to Hussein’s trial 
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TRANSNAT’L L. 1503, 1505-09 (2002). 
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 Arnaut, supra note 127, at 542. 
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regardless of where it takes place.136 The ICC’s Statute of Rome is the most 
recent and widely accepted codification of international criminal law. These 
statutes assume individual responsibility for crimes against the entire 
international community.137 In creating the Statute, its multi-national drafters 
relied on principles established in the ITCY, ITCR, Genocide Convention, 
Nuremberg Charter, and customary international law. As a result, any 
prosecution of Hussein should refer to this codification to conduct a trial that 
the majority of countries would view as fair and just.   
D. Ad Hoc Tribunal 
 The ad hoc tribunal provides the fourth and best option for Hussein’s 
prosecution. Under its Chapter VII powers, the United Nations Security 
Council may establish an ad hoc international criminal tribunal after it 
determines a threat to international peace and security.138 The Security Council 
instituted ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY)139 and for Rwanda 
(ICTR).140 The Council fashioned these tribunals after the International 
Military Tribunal, which was created by a treaty rather than by the United 
Nations. These tribunals survived challenges to the Security Council’s power 
to create them under Articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations Charter.141 The 
tribunals may exert subject-matter jurisdiction over both crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and war crimes. To ensure consistency, the same appellate 
body hears appeals from both the ICTY and the ICTR. 
 Tribunals simply apply existing law. The ICTY Statute requires that it 
apply only that “part of conventional international humanitarian law which has 
beyond all doubt become part of customary international law . . . .”142 If the 
                                                          
136
 See generally Jonathan M.H. Short, Note, Sexual Violence as Genocide: The 
Developing Law of the International Criminal Tribunals and the International Criminal Court, 
8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 503, 505 (2003) (using the Rome Statute as a guide). 
137
 See Theodore Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. 
J. INT’L. L. 554 (1995); Mark A. Summers, The International Court of Justice’s Decision in 
Congo v. Belgium: How Has it Affected the Development of A Principle of Universal 
Jurisdiction that Would Obligate All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 
63, 65 (2003). 
138
 See supra note 131. 
139
 ICTY Statute, supra note 131, at introduction ¶ 10. 
140
 ICTR Statute, supra note 131, at chapeau (introduction). 
141
 See Prosecutor v. Kanyabashi, Decision on the Defense Motion on Jurisdiction, 
Case No. ICTR-96-15-T, 19-29 (ICTR Trial Chamber June 18, 1997), available at 
http://www.ictr.org/wwwroot/ENGLISH/cases/Kanyabashi/decisions/180697.pdf (last visited 
February 16, 2004); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, PP 14-48 (ICTY App. Chamber Oct. 2, 
1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm (last visited 
February 16, 2004). 
142
 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council 
Resolution 808, P 29, U.N. Docs. S/25704, S/25704/Corr.1 (1993), reprinted in 2 VIRGINIA 
MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 8 (1995), available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statut/S25704.htm (last visited February 16, 2004). The fluid 
  23 
Security Council creates a tribunal for Iraq, the law would not apply ex post 
facto since it already existed as customary law and would resemble the ICTY 
and ICTR statutes. A tribunal would also avoid the problem of retroactivity in 
the ICC. Accordingly, to avoid challenges to the legitimacy of the prosecution, 
the Council should establish an International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq (ICTI) 
that parallels those of the ICTY and the ICTR. The same appellate body 
hearing appeals from the ICTY and ICTR could handle appeals for the ICTI. 
Although the United States has demonstrated hostility toward ad hoc tribunals 
in the past,143 diplomatic and legal impediments to prosecution of Hussein in 
other courts may encourage United States’ agreement. The ICTI would allow 
the victims of the regime to attend and testify in Hussein’s trial since it would 
occur in Iraq as well as provide the legal expertise for a trial of this magnitude. 
In fact, the Iraqi National Congress proposed and drafted a statute for this type 
of United Nations ad hoc tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi 
Ba’athist leadership.144 Since many of Iraq’s new leaders may come from this 
National Congress, the new leadership may also request an ad hoc tribunal. 
 Even though both the ICTY and the ICTR survived challenges to the 
Security Council’s power to create them, Hussein could still attempt a 
jurisdictional argument to prevent prosecution. Because the judges employed 
by the tribunals also rule on the validity of the tribunal’s establishment, 
Hussein could claim that the proceeding was not fair and impartial. Allowing 
judges to make appellate decisions concerning their own employment may be a 
conflict of interest.145 Hussein’s difficulty in asserting this defense would be 
the lack of any other court to hear his challenge. Alternatively, conducting the 
ad hoc tribunal in Iraq would provide for the close proximity of witnesses,146 
promote reconciliation by allowing victims to attend the trials, and would 
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ensure a more impartial trial than would a trial by either the Iraqi citizens or 
the new regime. Therefore, the ad hoc tribunal presents the best forum for 
jurisdiction.  
III. IRAQ’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS 
 
 Should the ICTI survive Hussein’s jurisdictional challenge, it could 
enforce Iraq’s treaty commitments as well as its commitments under current 
customary international law. Hussein’s commission of genocide and crimes 
against humanity violated numerous human rights treaties signed by Iraq. As 
of December 9, 2002, Iraq accepted the terms of the following treaties: the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
which Iraq signed on January 25, 1971;147 the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Iraq also signed on January 25, 1971;148 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), signed on January 14, 1970;149 the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 
signed on August 13, 1986;150 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
signed on June 15, 1994.151 As a member of the United Nations, Iraq has an 
additional “obligation to promote and protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms” and to abide by the “obligations [it has] undertaken” by signing 
human rights treaties.152 Like other states, Iraq must comply with customary 
law regardless of treaty ratification status.153  
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 The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law helps clarify obligations 
under customary international law. Iraq would violate customary international 
law if, as a matter of state policy, it practiced, encouraged or condoned: 
(a) genocide,  
(b) slavery or slave trade, 
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of 
individuals, 
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment, 
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,  
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or  
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognized human rights.154 
 
Sections (a)-(f) are considered jus cogens, or peremptory norms to which all 
countries must adhere.155 According to the Vienna Convention on Treaty 
interpretation, an international agreement or reservation that attempted to 
derogate from those norms would be void.156 
                                                                                                                                                         
interrelation between treaties and customary international law, see Evan Criddle, The Vienna 
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IV. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE KURDS 
A. Evolution of Genocide from Customary International Law  
As a peremptory norm of international law, any act of genocide would 
be illegal regardless of Iraq’s international obligations. Raphael Lemkin, a 
Polish law professor, first coined the term “genocide” in 1944, and intended it 
to signify “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of 
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating 
the groups themselves.”157 After World War II, the Allies formed the London 
Agreement, which included the Nuremberg Charter.158 The Allies used this 
agreement to prosecute the Nazis for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
crimes against peace. Since the Nuremberg indictments did not specifically 
include genocide, prosecutors charged defendants with “deliberate and 
systematic genocide” under the larger heading of crimes against humanity.159 
The tribunal did not convict any defendants directly or solely on this charge.160 
The Nuremberg Tribunals applied charges of crimes against humanity 
retroactively since the drafters considered those crimes part of customary 
international law.161 
Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (Control Council Law) built on 
Nuremberg’s first mention of genocide.162 Becoming effective in 1945, it 
provided a broader definition of crimes against humanity that allowed for 
prosecutions of genocide under its opening phrase, “including, but not limited 
to.” Two American courts, prosecuting crimes against humanity under their 
authority as an Allied occupation zone, applied this Control Council Law and 
convicted several defendants of genocide.163 These trials of Josef Alstötter, 
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Ulrich Greifelt, and others led to convictions based on participation “in the 
crime of genocide” and involvement in a systematic program of genocide164 
aimed at “the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups.”165 These 
American trials, along with genocide trials in Poland,166 propelled and 
prompted the international community to adopt a multilateral treaty on 
genocide that entered into effect in 1951.167  
This multilateral treaty, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), to which Iraq 
acceded on January 20, 1959, defined genocide in Article II as: 
Any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, 
racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group;168 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 
within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to 
another group.169  
  
To convict Hussein of genocide he must have “committed” one or more of the 
above forbidden acts against members of a protected group with the intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, that group.170 Hussein did not have to perform the 
acts himself. Instead, under Article III of the Genocide Convention, acts 
punishable under the treaty include “genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide; 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide; 
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[and] complicity in genocide.”171 Thus, if Hussein specifically ordered or even 
turned a blind eye to any of these acts, his failure to act would constitute 
genocide under the Genocide Convention. The International Court of Justice, 
the ITCY and ITCR statutes, as well as the International Criminal Court statute 
all follow the Convention’s definition and its general elements.  
 Even if Iraq had not acceded to the Convention, as a party to the United 
Nations, it must uphold certain basic human rights found in the preamble to the 
United Nations Charter. The preamble states that members of the United 
Nations aim to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person.”172 Genocide derogates from this general principle 
by disregarding the value of human life. 
B. Genocide against The Kurds: The Anfal Campaigns 
  Rather than reaffirming human rights, a number of documents and 
testimonials show that Hussein, through his own acts and the acts of others, 
attempted to annihilate the Kurdish segment of the Iraqi population. Because 
Hussein served as the RCC’s member in charge of “Kurdish affairs,” President 
of the Republic of Iraq, and Secretary General of the Ba’th Party, he is liable 
under the principle of command responsibility for ordering official acts. He 
specifically ordered, directed, and appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, 
“Chemical Ali,” to implement a comprehensive campaign against the Kurds 
which resulted in: (1) concentration camps, (2) mass summary executions, (3) 
widespread use of chemical weapons against the city of Halabja and dozens of 
Kurdish villages, and (4) complete destruction of Kurdish villages, which 
government documents described as “burned, destroyed, demolished, and 
purified.”173 In the words of Al-Majid, the Iraqi government took these steps 
“to solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs.”174 “Saboteurs” 
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We continued the deportations. I told the 
mustashars that they might say that they like their villages 
and that they won't leave. I said I cannot let your village 
stay because I will attack it with chemical weapons. Then 
you and your family will die. You must leave right now. 
Because I cannot tell you the same day that I am going to 
attack with chemical weapons. I will kill them all with 
chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything? The 
international community? Fuck them! The international 
community and those who listen to them.  
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refers to the Kurdish guerrillas and civilian sympathizers. When first ordered 
by Hussein to quiet the “Kurdish rebellion,” Al-Majid said “What am I 
supposed to do with them, these goats? . . . Take good care of them? No, I will 
bury them with bulldozers.”175 This symbolized the beginning of the Anfal 
Campaigns.176 Although initially believed dead, coalition forces captured Al-
Majid, or “Chemical Ali,” on August 21, 2003.177 Consequently, he may also 
face prosecution in an ad hoc tribunal. 
 Although President Hussein vested many of the powers for handling 
“Kurdish affairs” to his cousin, he involved himself personally in the 
operational aspects of Anfal through his position as president of the 
republic.178 After “redrawing the map of Iraqi Kurdistan,” which demonstrated 
his premeditation to commit genocide, approximately 5,000 to 8,000 
Barzani179 males “disappeared.”180 As President, Saddam Hussein stated, 
“[t]hey betrayed the country and they betrayed the covenant . . . we meted out 
stern punishment to them and they went to hell.”181 Although these acts 
                                                                                                                                                         
… This is my intention, and I want you to take serious note 
of it. As soon as we complete the deportations, we will 
start attacking them everywhere according to a systematic 
military plan. Even their strongholds. In our attacks we 
will take back one third or one half of what is under their 
control. If we can try to take two-thirds, then we will 
surround them in a small pocket and attack them with 
chemical weapons. I will not attack them with chemicals 
just one day, but I will continue to attack them with 
chemicals for fifteen days. Then I will announce that 
anyone who wishes to surrender with his gun will be 
allowed to do so. Anyone willing to come back is 
welcome, and those who do not return will be attacked 
again with new, destructive chemicals. I will not mention 
the name of the chemical because that is classified 
information. But I will say with new destructive weapons 
that will destroy you. So I will threaten them and motivate 
them to surrender. 
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occurred over the past twenty years, genocide is not subject to a statute of 
limitations.182 Any act of genocide violates Iraq’s obligations under the ICCPR 
to respect and promote the right to life.183 
 To convict Hussein of genocide, the prosecutor must prove, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, that Hussein killed the Kurds, caused them serious bodily or 
mental harm, deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about 
the their physical destruction, imposed measures intended to prevent Kurdish 
births, or forcibly transferred Kurdish children to another group.184 The Kurds 
must also qualify as a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, and the 
prosecutor must prove that Hussein intended to destroy them in whole or in 
part.185 
1. Concentration Camps 
 Hussein’s design of the Kurdish concentration camps inflicted 
conditions so severe that they would meet the Genocide Convention’s 
requirement that the perpetrator establish an environment “calculated to bring 
about [the group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part.”186 In Prosecutor 
v. Akayesu, ICTR interpreted Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention as 
requiring the subjection of “a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic 
expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services.”187 
Conditions in Kurdish camps met these requirements, as well as the 
Convention’s requirements for “causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group,” under Article II (b). In the Eichmann case, the District 
Court of Jerusalem stated that bodily or mental harm can be caused by 
“enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution . . . and by their 
detention in ghettos, transit camps and concentration camps in conditions 
which were designed to cause their degradation, deprivation of their rights as 
human beings, and to suppress them and cause them inhumane suffering and 
torture.”188  
It will be difficult to prosecute Hussein for this phase of the genocide 
without conclusive documentation of his knowledge of the camps.189 The 
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tribunal may infer Hussein’s intent, on a case-by-case basis from the material 
evidence so long as this evidence establishes a consistent pattern of conduct.190 
Although the ad hoc tribunal may impute the requisite knowledge from 
Hussein’s numerous official positions, he could argue that he lacked all 
knowledge because he designated both power and authority over the camps to 
Chemical Ali. 
2. Summary Executions 
 The Ba’ath Party itself established the principle of “collective 
implication” in the executions.191 The Party insisted that its members form part 
of the firing squads.192 For example, when Saddam Hussein assumed his 
presidency, he forced two dozen senior Ba’ath officials to confess to charges of 
treason.193 He then ordered the other senior officials to execute them on 
television to demonstrate their new loyalty to Hussein.194 On June 20, 1987, 
another document issued by the Northern Bureau Command with the seal of 
the RCC (which Hussein chairs) endorsed a policy of mass murder and 
incitement to pillage. It directed: 
                                                                                                                                                         
Genocide is distinct from other crimes insomuch 
as it embodies a special intent or dolus specialis. Special 
intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a 
constructive element of the crime, which demands that the 
perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged. Thus 
the special intent in the crime of genocide lies in “the 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group.” The Chamber found that “the 
offender is culpable only when he has committed one of 
the offences charged under Article 2(2) . . . with the clear 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group. 
The offender is culpable because he knew or should have 
known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or 
in part, a group.” 
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4. The corps commanders shall carry out random 
bombardments using artillery, helicopters and 
aircraft, at all times of the day or night in order 
to kill the largest number of persons present in 
those prohibited zones, keeping us informed of 
the results. 
 
5. All persons captured in those villages shall be 
detained and interrogated by the security services 
and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be 
executed after any useful information has been 
obtained from them, of which we should be duly 
notified.195 
 
Al-Majid signed the document and forwarded it to numerous branches 
including the Chairmen of the Legislative and Executive Councils and Party 
Intelligence.196 Under the Genocide Convention, summary and targeted 
executions constitute intentionally “killing members of the group” because 
they meet the ICTR requirement of “homicide with the intent to cause 
death.”197 The prosecution could prove the requisite mens rea and 
premeditation by using documents exchanged between Al-Majid and Hussein, 
as well as government videotapes of massive executions.198 
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3. Widespread Use of Chemical Weapons 
 The Iraqi regime kept meticulous records and routinely videotaped 
chemical weapons attacks on civilians as well as executions and village 
clearances.199 Having cameras ready to videotape the attacks demonstrates 
premeditation.200 Saddam Hussein murdered about 100,000 Kurds with 
chemical weapons.201 Under Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention, acts of 
chemical destruction resulting in death constitute genocide in that they meet 
the definitions of “killing members of the group” and “causing serious bodily 
and mental harm to members of the group.”202 
 As the ICTR noted in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, the 
tribunal should interpret the meaning of “serious bodily harm” and “serious 
mental harm” on a “case-by-case basis, using a common sense approach.”203 
According to the ICTR, “causing serious bodily harm” “could be construed to 
mean harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any 
serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses.”204 Acts of “serious 
mental harm” likewise includes “acts of bodily or mental torture, inhumane or 
degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence, and persecution.”205 The chemicals 
may have caused a lasting effect on the Kurds; however, the effects need not 
prove indelible or permanent for successful prosecution.206 
4. Complete Destruction of Kurdish Villages 
 Destruction of Kurdish homes, crops, and livestock by the Iraqi 
government exhibited Hussein’s desire to inflict conditions that would bring 
about the Kurds’ physical destruction. The United Nations Special Rapporteur 
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made numerous inquiries to Hussein asking for explanations of orders 
directing the execution of wounded civilians and the razing of certain 
neighborhoods.207 He sent no response. A government document titled 
“Registry of Eliminated Villages” contained the names and locations of a large 
number of eliminated villages.208 The ICTR Chamber reasoned that 
systematically expelling people from their homes would satisfy the requisite 
actus reus of Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention.209   
C. The Kurds as an Ethnic Group and Hussein’s Intent to Destroy 
 For Hussein’s actions to qualify as genocide against the Kurds, the 
Kurds must qualify as a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.210 In 
addition, Saddam Hussein must have intended to destroy them in whole or in 
part.211 The Kurds form a distinct ethnic group; they developed their own 
culture with a unique Kurdish style of dress and they speak their own 
language.212 They lived in the northern mountainous region of Iraq for 
thousands of years—the region was even designated “Kurdistan” in the 12th 
century.213 The ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu,214 stated that the term “ethnic 
group” is “used to refer to a group whose members speak the same language 
and/or have the same culture.”215 The Kurds have both their own language and 
their own distinct culture, thus they qualify as an ethnic group for the purposes 
of the Genocide Convention. 
 When Saddam Hussein appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, to 
extinguish the Kurds, Hussein exhibited the requisite intent to annihilate this 
ethnic group. One observer stated of Al-Majid, “‘[h]e was stupid and only 
carrying out Saddam Hussein’s orders.’”216 Documented exchanges between 
Al-Majid and Saddam Hussein make it clear that Hussein knew and approved 
of Al-Majid’s work.217 Besides a jurisdictional challenge, claiming that 
Hussein did not act with the requisite intent may be his best defense to 
genocide. Accordingly, he could allege that he simply moved or deported the 
Kurds without intending to destroy them. Hussein’s act of designating the 
power to Al-Majid works in Hussein’s favor. He may claim that because he 
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delegated all the power and authority for dealing with the Kurds to Al-Majid, 
Al-Majid acted without Hussein’s approval or knowledge. Although the court 
could still infer knowledge through command responsibility, the prosecution 
may find it more difficult to establish intent through this theory.  
Because Iraq acceded to the Genocide Convention on January 20, 1959, 
the crime of genocide existed in the form of a treaty and as customary 
international law during the 1980s when the majority of the above acts 
occurred. Accordingly, no significant legal barriers, such as an ex post facto 
application of the law, exist for prosecuting Saddam Hussein for genocide. 
Plentiful evidence exists to convict him for conspiracy to commit genocide,218 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide,219 or complicity in 
genocide.220  
Despite the mounting evidence against him, Hussein’s defense 
attorneys may rely on a number of mitigating factors. Hussein did attempt to 
unite the Kurds and the Iraqi people to create a state with a unique national 
identity. To create this state, Hussein spent significant financial resources to 
recover artifacts and piece together Iraq’s cultural history.221 He was the first 
Iraqi leader to visit the Kurdish region.222 In fact, not until the United States, 
Iran, and Israel contributed resources to promote the Kurdish insurgency in the 
1970s did Hussein begin the Anfal campaigns. Not only did the United States 
help ignite the conflict, it removed sanctions from Iraq in 1982 and shared 
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military intelligence with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.223 This union 
culminated in 1984 when, despite Iraq’s use of chemical weapons on Iranians, 
the Regan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to Iraq to strengthen ties with 
Saddam Hussein and to offer additional intelligence and money. When the 
United States eventually incited Kurdish rebellion but failed to support it in 
1991, Saddam Hussein squelched the rebellion with a widespread massacre of 
the Shi’ites. Consequently, Hussein’s attorneys may try to bring the United 
States in as a co-conspirator and deflect attention away from Hussein’s acts 
and toward discovering exactly what the United States knew. 
V. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED IN IRAQ 
 
 Saddam Hussein did not end his struggle to maintain power with Anfal 
campaigns or the Kurdish people. As head of the RCC, Hussein personally 
signed decrees condoning torture, deportation, unfair trials, amputations, and 
branding against his own people. Because many of these actions qualify as 
crimes against humanity, the ICTI prosecutor may indicate and prosecute 
Hussein for these acts.  
A. Evolution of Crimes against Humanity 
Like genocide, as the name “crimes against humanity” suggests, these 
crimes offend the whole of humanity and, consequently, the ICTR and ICTY 
considers them international crimes. A Baptist minister first coined the phrase 
“crimes against humanity,” in an 1890 letter to the United States Secretary of 
State.224 However, the 1945 Nuremberg trials first defined and prosecuted 
defendants for crimes against humanity.225 The Nuremberg Charter 
substantively removed state immunity for crimes against humanity, and 
described these crimes as: 
Murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during 
the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or 
religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal whether or not in violation of the 
domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.226 
 
                                                          
223
 See Human Rights Watch World Report 1989, Human Rights Watch, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/Iraq.htm#TopOfPage (last visited Feb. 21, 2004). 
224
 James D. Fry, Comment, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide: 
The Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169, 183 (2002) 
(citing ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST 112, 317 n.112 (1998)).  
225
 Id.  
226
 Nuremberg Charter, supra note 158.  
  37 
Hussein did not have to personally commit these acts since “[l]eaders, 
organizers, instigators, and accomplices, participating in the formulation or 
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of 
such plan.”227 Approval by the United Nation’s General Assembly to use this 
definition to prosecute heads of state chipped away at traditional immunity and 
helped solidify the introduction of crimes against humanity into international 
law.228 
 Unlike genocide, definitions for crimes against humanity vary. The 
Tokyo Charter in Article 5(c) resembled the Nuremberg Charter, but did not 
include persecutions on religious grounds.229 Allied Control Council Law No. 
10, Article 2, broadened the concept of crimes against humanity in its 
definition by including the words “not limited to” and by specifically adding 
“imprisonment, torture, [and] rape.”230 Furthermore, the ICTR and ICTY 
defined crimes against humanity differently from both former definitions and 
from one another. A prosecutor in the ICTY may prosecute “murder, 
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, 
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, and other inhumane 
acts” only when committed in armed conflict and directed against a civilian 
population.231 The ICTR, on the other hand, allows the prosecutor to prosecute 
when the accused “committed [acts] as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or 
religious grounds.”232 Though the ICTY does not specify the need for a 
“widespread or systematic attack,” it interpreted the phrase “civilian 
population” to include this requirement.233  
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In the International Criminal Court, relevant portions of Article 7 
similarly define crimes against humanity to include murder, “[d]eportation or 
forcible transfer of [a] population,” “[p]ersecution against any identifiable 
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious . . . 
or other grounds,” “[i]mprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical 
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law,” and torture. For 
any of these acts to qualify as crimes against humanity the perpetrator must 
commit them as “part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a 
civilian population” and have knowledge of the attack’s systematic nature. 
Crimes against humanity may occur during peacetime or war.234 Like the 
ICTR, the Rome Statute employs the qualification “widespread or systematic 
attack” which broadens its jurisdiction and makes these requirements 
alternatives. This mirrors the most recent approach taken by the ICTY in 
Prosecutor v. Tadić.235 The ICTR, while it does not use an either/or approach, 
defined the term “widespread” as “massive, frequent, large scale action, carried 
out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a 
multiplicity of victims.”236 The court interpreted “systematic” as “thoroughly 
organized and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy 
involving substantial public or private resources.”237  
B. Basic Elements Pertinent To All Crimes against Humanity  
Regardless of the precise language used in any one statute, the 
prosecution must establish the same five elements under Article 5 of the ICTY, 
Article 3 of the ICTR, and Article 7 of the ICC to prove Hussein’s guilt. These 
elements include: (1) the occurrence of an “attack”; (2) a link or “nexus” 
between Saddam Hussein’s action or inaction and the attack; (3) the attack’s 
“widespread or systematic” nature; (4) the attack’s target as a civilian 
population; and finally, (5) that Hussein’s knowledge of the attacks fulfills the 
requisite mens rea.238  
Hussein conducted several “attacks” by deporting the Kurds, depriving 
Iraqi citizens of fundamental liberties, and by torturing Iraqi citizens.239 These 
instances qualify as attacks because the term concerns the mistreatment of 
civilians including the state’s own population.240 The ICTY, in Prosecutor v. 
                                                          
234
 The International Criminal Court: Elements Of Crimes And Rules Of Procedure 
And Evidence 63 (Roy S. Lee et. al. eds., 2001)[hereinafter International Criminal Court 
Elements]. 
235
 Case No. IT-94-T, Opinion and Judgment, paras. 647-48 (ICTY Trial Chamber II, 
May 7, 1997). 
236
 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 580 (ICTR Trial 
Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998).  
237
 Id. 
238
 See Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT’L 
L. J. 237, 244 (2002). 
239
 See infra Part V.C. 
240
 Mettraux, supra note 238, at 245. 
  39 
Nikolic, listed several factors relevant for determining whether an attack 
occurred against a civilian population.241 In its list, the court examined 
“whether summary arrests, detention, torture and other crimes have been 
committed,” and “whether massive transfers of civilians to camps have taken 
place.”242 Similarly, the ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, stated, “the act must 
be inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering or serious injury 
to body or to mental or to physical health.”243 These factors remain particularly 
relevant in the Iraqi situation where the government transferred Kurds to 
camps, summarily arrested them,244 detained them,245 and tortured Iraqi 
civilians.246 Each of these actions constitutes an attack; thus, the first element 
is satisfied.  
The second element, the nexus between the acts of Hussein and the 
attacks, is detailed in each specific act’s section below. However, within each 
section two things must be established: (1) the “commission” of the act 
(deportation, deprivation, torture) that furthered the attack against the Iraqi 
people (including the Kurds), and (2) Saddam Hussein’s knowledge that these 
orders/acts constituted part of the greater “attack.”247 A single act, such as 
issuing a decree, suffices so long as it is part of the larger attack.248  
The Iraqi population satisfies the third requirement that Hussein carry 
out the attack on “a civilian population.” As Iraqis living under Hussein’s 
regime, they possess the requisite characteristic of a geographically self-
contained group of people.249 In some ways, the breadth of the Iraqi population 
as a target also satisfies the fourth element of a “widespread or systematic 
attack.” To qualify as a widespread or systematic attack, the action “need not 
be committed at the same time and place as the attack or share all of the 
features of the attack,” however, “it must, by its characteristics, aims, nature, 
or consequence objectively form part of the discriminatory attack.”250 
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Hussein’s actions fulfill both requirements since the Iraqi population comprises 
a large number of victims and Hussein,251 in his power as president, 
orchestrated a systematic governmental attack against them.252 
Finally, the prosecutor must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Saddam Hussein possessed mens rea that demonstrated he knew about the 
attack.253 As interpreted by the ICTR, Hussein must have “actual or 
constructive knowledge of the broader context of the attack, meaning that 
[Hussein] must known that his act(s) is part of a widespread or systematic 
attack on a civilian population and pursuant to some kind of policy or plan.”254 
To establish intent for certain acts, the ICC requires the perpetrator to either 
“mean to cause that consequence,” or be “aware that it will occur in the 
ordinary course of events.”255 “Knowledge” is similar, but for purposes of the 
Rome Statute, it means “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence 
will occur in the ordinary course of events.”256 Mental elements requiring that 
Hussein knew about the widespread or systematic attack, do not require proof 
that he knew everything about the attack, or even that he knew the precise 
details of plans.257 The prosecutor may satisfy these elements by a simple 
indication that the Hussein intended to “further such an attack.”258  
The prosecutor may have the most difficulty proving the mens rea 
element. For the most part, crimes against humanity are not strict liability 
crimes. Article 28 of the ICC provides guidance by discussing a form of 
constructive knowledge for trying “superiors” such as Saddam Hussein. 
Hussein could be held criminally responsible for crimes against humanity 
committed by his subordinates. These subordinates would include the Iraqi 
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military or any type of Iraqi security force. Hence, Hussein may be liable for 
failing to “exercise control properly over such subordinates” in three 
situations: (1) where Hussein either knew, or “consciously disregarded” 
information, such as United Nations or Human Rights reports indicating that 
his subordinates were either committing or about to commit such crimes; (2) 
where the crimes “concerned activities that were within [his] effective 
responsibility and control”; or (3) where Hussein failed to take all “necessary 
and reasonable measures” within his power to stop the acts from being 
committed, or alternatively, failed to “submit the matter to the competent 
authorities for investigation and prosecution.”259 The ICC’s position, requiring 
that a superior knew or should have known, differs from an earlier position 
taken by the United States Supreme Court which applied a standard just short 
of strict liability to a Japanese Commanding General.260  
C. Saddam Hussein’s Crimes against Humanity   
1. Deportation or Forcible Transfer of the Kurdish Population 
 The prosecutor may address the majority of Saddam Hussein’s actions 
against the Kurds under the Genocide Convention. However, the Convention 
does not address deportation, which constitutes a distinct crime against 
humanity. The United Nations General Assembly expressed concern over the 
“forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians,” “the 
destruction of Iraqi towns and villages,” and “the fact that tens of thousands of 
displaced Kurds have had to take refuge in camps and shelters in the north of 
Iraq.”261  
Customary international law recognizes deportation as a crime against 
humanity, as does Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, Article 5(d) of the 
ICTY, Article 3(d) of the ICTR, and in Allied Control Council Law No. 10. In 
addition, the ICCPR states, “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to 
enter his own country.”262 To convict Hussein of deporting the Kurdish 
population, he must have used expulsion or other types of coercion to forcibly 
transfer or deport one or more persons into another State or place.263 
“Population,” as interpreted by the ICTY in the Tadic case, “impl[ies] crimes 
of a collective nature and thus exclude single or isolated acts which . . . do not 
rise to the level of crimes against humanity.”264 The Iraqi regime’s 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians qualifies as more than 
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a single or isolated act. “Forcibly” does not denote only physical force, but 
may also encompass threats or types of coercion caused by creating a coercive 
environment or by using “fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological 
oppression or abuse of power.”265 Hussein appears to have forcibly deported 
the Kurds. He issued an order concerning Kurdish villages that stated, “within 
their jurisdiction, the armed forces must kill any human being or animal 
present within these areas. They are totally prohibited.”266 
 In addition to a forcible deportation, the displaced persons must have 
been “lawfully present” in the area prior to being moved.267 “Lawful” probably 
refers first to national law, but where a national law severely contradicts an 
international law, as in the Iraqi situation, then “lawful” should refer to an 
international principle.268 Otherwise, dictators such as Hussein could 
circumvent this element by enforcing self-interested laws like Iraqi directive 
28/3650 that prohibited human life in over 1,000 Kurdish villages.269 Prior to 
this directive, the Kurds lawfully inhabited these areas for more than a 
thousand years.270 Strictly interpreting “lawful” as national law where it would 
allow dictators to legislate their way out of criminal conduct contradicts 
principles in the Nuremburg Charter.271  
 As commander-in-chief of Iraq’s armed forces and as Chairman of the 
RCC, Hussein condoned the deportation of over 400,000 Iraqi citizens 
(including Kurds) holding valid Iraqi passports.272 Hussein’s personal 
responsibility for the purges began with his accession to power in which he 
deported or executed several Shi’ite clerics.273 Evidence exists to support 
Hussein’s knowledge, both actual and constructive, of the forced deportation 
of non-Arabs in Hussein’s Arabization campaign. United Nations Special 
Rapporteur Max van der Stoel submitted numerous reports to the United 
Nations that detailed instances of forced relocations and wrote various letters 
to Hussein and the Iraqi government requesting evidence of cessation.274 If 
nothing else, these letters put Hussein on notice of violations by subordinates. 
Hence, his defense would have difficulty establishing his ignorance. The 
discovery phase of any prosecution may uncover additional documents actually 
signed by Hussein. 
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2. Arbitrary and Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty  
 The list of crimes against humanity does not end with Kurdish 
deportation. Hussein also imprisoned Iraqi citizens and deprived them of their 
physical liberty through arbitrary arrests, detentions, unfair trials, long prison 
sentences, branding, amputation, and excessive use of the death penalty. The 
ICTR, the ICTY, and the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 prohibit 
excessive and unjust imprisonment in their instruments. Previous statutes 
include the term “other severe deprivation of physical liberty.” This phrase has 
emerged as a “catch all” provision for borderline types of confinement that 
may not fit within other definitions but nonetheless rises to the level of a crime 
against humanity. Article 9 of the ICCPR requires government to ensure 
certain due process rights including prohibition against arbitrary arrests or 
detentions, prompt information concerning charges, timely trials, and court 
proceedings within a reasonable time.275 Similarly, Article 14 of the ICCPR 
entitles everyone to a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.”276  
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the ICTY 
require the prosecutor to establish three general elements before convicting 
Hussein for unlawfully imprisoning or severe depriving Iraqis of physical 
liberty.277 First, the prosecutor must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Hussein imprisoned or otherwise deprived one or more persons of their 
physical liberty.278 Second, the prosecutor must establish that Hussein’s 
conduct was severe enough to breach the fundamental rules of international 
law by arbitrarily depriving the Kurds of their liberty.279 “Fundamental” refers 
to the nature of the violation, not whether the accused complied with every 
procedure available in international law.280 “Arbitrarily” means that no legal 
basis can be invoked to justify the deprivation of liberty and that the individual 
did not benefit from the due process of law.281 Third, the prosecutor must 
prove that Hussein knew about the imprisonments and deprivations and was 
aware of their severity.282 The ICTY interpreted this third element to mean “the 
accused, or a person or persons for whom the accused bears criminal 
responsibility [performed the act] with the intent to deprive the individual 
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arbitrarily of his or her physical liberty or in the reasonable knowledge that is 
act or omission is likely to cause arbitrary deprivation of physical liberty.”283 
Despite signing the ICCPR,284 in which Iraq purports to guarantee its 
citizens “a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law,”285 Hussein deprived a number of Iraqi citizens of 
their due process rights in several ways. Little or no due process exists in Iraqi 
courts.286 The government conducts trials in camera, before “special courts,”287 
allows military officers and even civil servants (all of whom lack judicial 
training and the necessary autonomy for impartial judgments) to preside over 
trials,288 and often limits legal aid to the actual trial date.289  
The prosecutor should be able to establish Hussein’s knowledge of the 
deprivations of due process and resulting imprisonments. The families of 
victims and officials from the United Nations sent letters directly to Saddam 
Hussein and the Iraqi Government.290 These letters, combined with visits by 
the United Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights 
provide evidence of Hussein’s knowledge. The Rapporteur may have based his 
visit to Iraq, in part, on allegations of the lack of fair trials and the suppression 
of freedom of expression and association.291 His report stated that the 
Government of Iraq continued to disregard its obligations under Articles 9 and 
14 of the ICCPR.292 These articles prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention as 
well as entitle citizens to a fair and pubic hearing by a competent, independent 
and impartial tribunal.293 The report expressed concern about long detentions 
without charges, the lack of access to lawyers, non-public trials, death 
sentences in absentia, and the lack of an appellate body to review decisions.294  
3. “Other Inhumane Acts”: Excessive Punishments & Excessive Use of the 
Death Penalty 
 
The ICTR and ICTY prohibit acts that are inhumane in nature and 
character that are not specifically included in their particular instruments, but 
are “of comparable seriousness” and “comparable gravity” to the enumerated 
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acts.295 As the ICTR noted in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 
“[t]hese will be acts or omissions that deliberately cause serious mental or 
physical suffering or injury or constitute a serious attack on human dignity.296 
The Prosecution must prove a nexus between the inhumane act and the great 
suffering or serious injury to mental or physical health of the victim.”297 The 
ICTI should determine whether an act constitutes an inhumane act “on a case-
by-case basis.”298 In the ICTR, the inhumane act or omission must “(a) [b]e 
directed against member(s) of the civilian population; (b) [t]he perpetrator 
must have discriminated against the victim(s), on one or more of the 
enumerated discriminatory grounds; (c) [t]he perpetrator’s act or omission 
must form a part of a widespread or systematic attack and the perpetrator must 
have knowledge of this attack.”299 In Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, 
the ICTR acknowledged, “a third party could suffer serious mental harm by 
witnessing acts committed against other, particularly against family or 
friends.”300 The ICTR held that the defendant act of decapitation, castration, 
and piercing a skull with a spike constituted “other inhumane acts” in 
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka.301  
The ICTY’s interpretation of “other inhumane acts” varies slightly 
from that of the ICTR. The tribunal in Prosecutor v. Vasilijevic required that 
the prosecutor establish the following elements for “other inhumane acts:”  
(i) the occurrence of an act or omission of similar 
seriousness to the other enumerated acts under 
the Article; (ii) the act or omission caused 
serious mental or physical suffering or injury or 
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constituted a serious attack on human dignity; 
and (iii) the act or omission was performed 
deliberately by the accused or a person or 
persons for whose acts and omissions he bears 
criminal responsibility.302 
 
To assess the seriousness of an act, the tribunal should consider the factual 
circumstances, the context in which the act or omission occurred, the personal 
circumstances of the victim including his or her age, sex, and health, as well as 
the physical, mental, and moral effects on the victim.303 The tribunal may also 
consider the long-term effects of the act or omission on the victim.304 
Hussein signed a number of decrees mandating branding and 
amputations as punishments for Iraqi citizens.305 The tribunal may need to 
consider each branding or amputation on a case-by-case basis, but may also 
take Iraq’s other international obligations into consideration when determining 
whether these acts constitute an inhumane act. Article 7 of the ICCPR, a 
“fundamental” rule of law to which Iraq is a party, states, “[n]o one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.”306 Although the general comments to the ICCPR do not 
explicitly list the treatments considered degrading, the comments forbid acts 
that cause either mental or physical suffering. Branding and amputations would 
most likely qualify as “excessive chastisement ordered as a punishment for a 
crime or as an educative or disciplinary measure.”307 The ICCPR permits no 
derogation from Article 7. Hussein, as the primary sponsor and promulgator 
this punishment seems to have violated this treaty. Because Hussein signed the 
decrees, the prosecutor should have little difficulty establishing Hussein’s 
knowledge of the decrees and their potential effects on Iraqi citizens. 
Consequently, the ICTI may convict him of “other inhumane acts.” 
 Saddam Hussein also signed an order instituting the death penalty for 
all deserters and draft evaders and gave it retroactive application.308 This 
retroactive application even contravenes the Iraqi Penal Code, which states in 
Article 1, “[n]o act or omission shall be penalized except in accordance with a 
legislative provision under which the said act or omission is regarded as a 
criminal offense at the time of its occurrence.”309 Article 6(2) of the ICCPR 
also forbids excessive use of the death penalty, and states “[i]n countries which 
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have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only 
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of 
the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present 
Covenant.”310  
These decrees promoting widespread use of the death penalty not only 
conflict with fundamental rules of international law, but also violate Hussein’s 
agreement under the ICCPR. The deprivation of life for minor offenses such as 
theft, drug trafficking, and affiliation with political opposition, breach Article 6 
of the ICCPR. Hussein’s signatures on the documents show that he not only 
consented to the decrees, but also ordered them himself. The Special 
Rapporteur’s reports and requests for additional information alerted Hussein to 
the severity of the situation, yet Hussein refused to provide additional 
information and actually issued more decrees. Although Hussein’s actions 
breached Iraq’s treaties, for the ICTI to hold Hussein personally liable, these 
breaches must constitute “other inhumane acts.” Like the analysis for branding 
and amputations, the ICTI would need to examine the circumstances for each 
instance in which Hussein’s officials actually carried out the death penalty for 
minor violations on a case-by-case basis. The families of the victims will most 
likely be able to fill in these details, and additional evidence may emerge 
during the trial. 
4. Torture 
 The ICTY,311 ICTR,312 and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 all 
expressly list torture as a crime against humanity.313 Interestingly, neither the 
Nuremberg nor the Tokyo Charters specified torture as a crime against 
humanity, however, it would still have qualified as an “inhumane act.” Article 
7(2)(e) of the Rome Statute defines “torture” as “the intentional infliction of 
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in custody 
or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.”314 
Furthermore, under the ICC, torture need not be carried out for a particular 
purpose to constitute a crime against humanity.315 The absence of a need for a 
particular purpose differs from requirements in the Torture Convention.316 
Since Iraq is not a party to the Torture Convention, those principles would not 
strictly apply. However, Iraq is a party to the ICCPR which states in Article 7, 
“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
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treatment or punishment.”317 The general comments to the ICCPR allow no 
derogations or justifications from this article, which seems to make 
government parties strictly liable.318 
 To convict Saddam Hussein of torture in a tribunal with a statute 
similar to the Rome Statute, ICTY, or ICTR the prosecutor must meet several 
elements. First, Hussein or his guards must have inflicted severe mental or 
physical suffering on a person or persons in Hussein’s control or custody.319 
Second, Hussein or his officials must have intended to inflict, by act or 
omission the mental or physical pain.320 Finally, Hussein or his officials must 
have aimed their actions or omissions “at obtaining information or a 
confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third 
person, or at discriminating on any ground, against the victim or a third 
person.”321 Torture cannot have occurred only as a result of “lawful sanctions.” 
No indication exists as to whether “lawful” refers to national or international 
law. However, in order for this element to make any sense when applied to a 
state actor such as Saddam Hussein, it must indicate international law.  
The ICCPR’s 1992 general comments to Article 7 make clear Saddam 
Hussein’s duty to the Iraqi people. They state in part, “[i]t is the duty of the 
State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other 
measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited in article 7, whether 
inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official 
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capacity or in a private capacity.”322 “The text of article 7 allows of no 
limitation.”323 No justifications or extenuating circumstances may be used as 
an excuse for any reason. In this regard, the Committee noted that “it is not 
sufficient for the implementation of article 7 to prohibit such treatment or to 
make it a crime.”324 The prohibition extends to acts that cause both physical 
and mental suffering.325 It also extends to prolonged solitary confinement.326 
Amnesties for committing torture do not comport with the duties in the 
ICCPR, and contradict the duty of the States to investigate all such acts.327 
By knowingly promoting and tolerating torture in Iraq, Hussein 
violated his duty under the ICCPR, and the prosecutor could convict him under 
the ICTY or ICTR statutes. In his official capacity, prisoners are effectively 
under his control, and, under the ICCPR, no sanctions allowing torture may be 
“lawful.” Thus, the ICTI may convict Hussein of torturing prisoners in an ad 
hoc tribunal. Iraq may also face sanctions in a proceeding, possibly in the 
International Court of Justice, that strictly determines Iraq’s compliance with 
the ICCPR treaty.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
 For all of the Iraqi citizens to begin a peaceful new government, they 
should be allowed to participate in justice system that permits them to voice 
their collective experiences before a knowledgeable judge. An ad hoc tribunal, 
instituted by the United Nations Security Council’s Chapter VII power, 
provides the best option for prosecuting Saddam Hussein and for promoting 
reconciliation. Ensuring that Hussein receives a fair trial will set valuable legal 
precedent for both the international and the Iraqi community. Justice brought 
about by the ICTI should play an integral role in rebuilding Iraqi sovereignty 
and in promoting a solid state of democracy after years of internal turmoil.  
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